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Separation of Powers in Municipal Government: 
Division of Executive and Legislative Authority 
The separation of powers doctrine has traditionally been con- 
sidered to be virtually irrelevant to the functioning of local gov- 
ernment. In recent decades, however, municipal government has 
evolved dramatically as the increasingly popular home rule provi- 
sions in state constitutions have allowed cities to draft their own 
charters1 and state legislatures have authorized a wide variety of 
optional governmental forms.' A dominant feature in many of 
these new forms is the strengthened position of local executive 
power. In accordance with this trend, a few courts have recently 
recognized that the separation of powers doctrine applies in the 
context of municipal government disputes.' In the case of 
Martindale v. Anderson4 the Supreme Court of Utah carried this 
trend to its ultimate conclusion: the complete separation of exec- 
utive and legislative powers with a blanket grant of executive 
power to the mayor. 
This Comment will provide an overview of the judicial recog- 
nition of the separation of municipal executive and legislative 
powers. I t  will then focus on the Martindale decision and examine 
the theoretical implications of reallocating municipal powers. 
This Comment will then consider the practical consequences of 
distributing functions according to the executive-legislative dis- 
tinction and, finally, will suggest some possible mechanisms for 
checking potential abuse of executive power in a municipal sepa- 
ration of powers system. 
A. Traditional View 
Courts traditionally have declared that the doctrine of sepa- 
ration of governmental powers is inapplicable at the local level. 
1. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, 00 3-6; ILL. CONST. art. W, 5 6; M m .  CONST. ire VII, 
9 22. 
2. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 48 40:69A-1 to -210 (West 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 
$0 9-101 to 12-114 ( W e ~ t  1978). 
3. Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal. 2d 569, 170 P.2d 904 (1946); Municipal Court v. Patrick, 
254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971); Bmidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). 
4. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
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In 1868, for example, the California Supreme Court in People v. 
Provines" held the state constitutional requirement that govern- 
ment be divided into separate branches did not apply to munici- 
p a l i t i e ~ . ~  The legal rationale was that, since the state constitution 
itself did not create local governments (a function left up to the 
state legislature), the constitutional separation of powers require- 
ment did not apply to ~ i t i e s . ~  The policy rationale was that sepa- 
ration of powers serves to prevent the abuses which might arise 
from an unchecked concentration of power.n The court reasoned 
that since a municipality was the creature of a superior govern- 
ment, the superior government provided a sufficient check on 
potential abuse a t  the lower level.' 
In 1942, the New York Court of Appeals rejected Mayor La- 
Guardia's argument in LaGuardia v. Smithlo that New York 
City's government was patterned after the federal model, with 
independent, coordinate branches, and denied the mayor's claim 
of executive immunity from a subpoena duces tecum issued by 
the city c ~ u n c i l . ~ ~  As recently as 1973 the New Jersey Supreme 
5. 34 Cal. 520 (1868). 
6. "In short," the court held, "the Third Article of the Constitution means that the 
powers of the State Government, not the local governments thereafter to be created by 
the Legislature, shall he divided into three departments . . . ." Id. at 534. See also Santo 
v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 220 (1856). 
7. 34 Cal. at 534. 
8. The recent appearance of the separation of powers doctrine in local government 
seems to be based largely on a different rationale-the need for increased efficiency. See 
Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 569,207 S.E.2d 475,478 (1974). In spite of the inefficiency 
inherent in a government with separated powers, this form of government may be more 
efficient than the traditional municipal forms since the power to make executive decisions 
normally resides in a single individual rather than in a group of individuals. 
9. 34 Cal. at 537. The court explained: 
The mischief, however, against which [the framers of the federal and state 
constitutionsl sought to provide, did not come from inferior or subordinate 
officers, but from the higher grades, in whose hands the first and leading powers 
of the Government were vested. So far as the former were concerned, they were 
sufficiently under the control of the latter. Abuse of power could not come from 
the former in such measure as to destroy or overthrow the liberties of the people, 
except by direction or connivance of the latter. To surround the latter with 
checks was a sufficient protection against the former. 
Id. 
10. 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942). 
11. A special investigative committee of the city council had sought a written report 
in the mayor's possession by serving him with a subpoena duces tecum. The mayor refused 
to produce the report, claiming executive immunity. The court recognized the city charter 
did prescribe some independent functions for the major and council, but noted that under 
the charter the mayor also performed certain legislative functions. The court reasoned that 
since the legislative and executive functions are not as well separated at  the city level as 
they are a t  the national level, the mayor could not invoke executive immunity. Id. 
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Court rejected a claim that resolutions passed by the governing 
body of a township restructuring the police department offended 
the doctrine of separation of powers.12 The New Jersey court 
pointed out that since the township's governing body possessed a 
broad statutory grant of power, and since the authority of the 
chief of police was merely derived from that governing the 
separation of powers doctrine had no application.14 
This general rule that separation of powers does not apply to 
municipalities means only that a separation between the execu- 
tive and legislative functions of local government is not manda- 
tory? It does not mean that such a separation is impossible? 
One recent case holding that the separation of powers doctrine 
did not apply in a local setting implied a state statute or munici- 
pal charter might specifically provide for the separation of pow- 
ers." In practice, however, true separation of powers has been 
virtually unknown a t  the local level until recently. 
B. Emergence of New Forms of Municipal Government 
During the nineteenth century, the weak-mayor form of city 
government predominated in the United States, although some 
strengthening of the mayor's powers took place by the latter part 
of the century? The commission form emerged early in the twen- 
tieth century, followed by the emergence of the commission- 
manager or council-manager form.lg All of these forms involved 
12. Smith v. Township of Hazlet, 63 N.J. 523, 309 A.2d 210 (1973). 
13. Id. This case is a good example of the traditional legal status of municipal execu- 
tive departments: they operate largely on power derived from the municipal legislative 
body rather than directly from the state legislature. 
14. Id. See Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 104 A.2d 10 (1954). 
15. Separation may be required between state courts and local legislative bodies. 
E.g.,  County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 721, 532 P.2d 495, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
631 (1975). This Comment deals only with the separation of local executive and legislative 
functions. 
16. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (since the manner in which a state 
divides the functions of government is a matter for its own determination, a separation of 
powers infringement does not constitute a due process violation); 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 
1218 n.9 (1942). 
17. Ruggeri v. City of St. Louis, 441 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Mo. 1969). 
18. Boynton, City Councils: Their Role in the Legislative System, 11976) MUNICIPAL 
Y.B. 67. The weak-mayor form of municipal government is a council-mayor form "in 
which the mayor and the council share a range of legislative and administrative powers." 
Id. at  67. 
19. Id. The commission form of government unifies "policy-making and policy- 
implementing activities in a council composed of major functional department heads who 
were elected to office." Id. The commission-manager or council-manager form has the 
same basic structure but also utilizes a city manager who is subordinate to the council or 
commission. Id. 
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extensive mingling of functions, with little or no concern for the 
separation of powers. 
While most municipalities ultimately depend upon state 
government as their source of a ~ t h o r i t y , ~  cities today are gener- 
ally granted considerable choice concerning their particular form 
of government. In a majority of the states, cities have the power 
(in some cases even without the approval of the state legislature) 
to draft and amend home rule  charter^,^' and in many states-cities 
are allowed to choose from among several optional statutory 
A new trend toward more divided governmental authority 
has emerged as cities have increased the power and responsibility 
of the mayor in order to improve administrative effi~iency.~" Con- 
sequently, the greatest separation of powers today is found in the 
mayor-council form of municipal go~ernrnen t ,~~  and the role of 
the mayor is also expanding in council-manager forms in large 
cities.25 
C. Increasing Judicial Recognition of the Separation 
of Municipal Powers 
An early indication that  separation of municipal powers 
might eventually be recognized appeared in the forceful 1942 dis- 
sent by Chief Justice Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals 
in LaGuardia v .  Smith." The Chief Justice vigorously attacked 
the majority's view that the separation of powers doctrine did not 
- - -  - - - - - pp 
20. See, e .g ,  Opinion of the Justices, 276 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1971); In re Elliot, 74 
Wash. 2d 600, 604, 446 P.2d 347, 351 (1968). 
21. 1 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW $8 3.00-.01, 3.05 (1978). See, e .g  , CAL. 
CONST. art. XI, 88 3-6; ILL. CONST. art. VII, 8 6; MICH. CONST. art. VII, Ej 22. 
22. Eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. EjEj 40:69A-1 to -210 (West 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 
66 9-101 to 12-114 (West 1978). 
23. H. HALLMAN, G. WASHNIS, & E. CRAWFORD, ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES OF CITY 
GOVERNMENT 14-15 (1973); 3 MCQUILLAN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Ej 12.43 (3d ed. repl. 
1973). 
24. In 1973, the mayor-council form was used in the majority of the 32 cities with 
populations over 400,000. H. HALLMAN, G. WASHNIS, & E. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, a t  5. 
25. Id. a t  4,15; E .  LEWIS, THE URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87-88 (1973). One study found 
the mayor acts as the presiding officer of the city council or commission most often in the 
commission form, next most often in the council-manager form, and least often in the 
council-mayor form, concluding that "the difference reflects the extent to which some 
strong mayor cities have adopted a theory of the separation of legislative and executive 
powers comparable to that a t  the state or national level." Boynton, supra note 18, a t  72. 
The same study showed the mayor had the right to vote on all issues before the council 
or commission in 82% of the cities using the commission form, 72% of those with the 
council-manager form, and only 19% of those with the council-mayor form. A further 
distinguishing feature of the council-mayor form is the mayoral veto. Id. 
26. 288 N.Y. 1,. 8, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1942) (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). 
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protect the mayor from a subpoena issuing under the authority 
of the city council. Where the fundamental law of any govern- 
ment distributes the executive, legislative, and judicial functions 
among different branches, he argued, it necessarily implies that 
the branches are to be kept separate and distinct.27 Since the New 
York City Charter was to be "construed in the light of these tried 
traditions of American go~ernment , "~~  and since the charter con- 
ferred broad executive power on the mayor and broad legislative 
power on the city council,2g he contended it is "necessarily im- 
plied in the grant of power to each a limitation that neither . . . 
may encroach upon the field reserved for the other."Whief Jus- 
tice Lehman further reasoned that these areas of exclusive power 
can exist even though the separation of powers is not  complete:^' 
and argued that in the LaGuardia case the city council had inter- 
fered in an exclusively executive realm.32 
The argument that the separation of powers doctrine could 
justify a mayor's assertion of an exclusive executive power was 
adopted four years later by the California Supreme Court in 
Kennedy v. Ross." In that case the California court upheld the 
validity of a contract made by the mayor of San Francisco with- 
out the authorization of the city's board of supervisors. The court 
found that the framers of the San Francisco Charter had intended 
to create a "division or separation of powers,"34 depriving the 
board of supervisors of all administrative functions." Similarly, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court commented in 1962 that the sepa- 
ration of powers was the fundamental theory underlying the city 
manager form of g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
While Kennedy v. Ross applied the separation of powers doc- 
trine to recognize additional authority in the executive branch, 
some more recent decisions have applied the same doctrine to cut 
the other direction. In 1973, for example, the Supreme Court of 
Florida used the separation of powers rationale to proscribe the 
mayor's power to establish a curfew and a penalty for its viola- 
27. Id. at 10, 41 N.E.2d at 157. 
28. Id. at 15, 41 N.E.2d at 160. 
29. Id. at 13, 41 N.E.2d at 159. 
30. Id. at 12, 41 N.E.2d at 158. 
31. Id. at 13, 41 N.E.2d at 159. 
32. Id. at 15-16, 41 N.E.2d at 160. 
33. 28 Cal. 2d 569, 170 P.2d 904 (1946). 
34. Id. at 576, 170 P.2d at 909. 
35. Id. at 577, 170 P.2d at 909. 
36. Clifton v. Zweir, 36 N.J. 309, 177 A.2d 545 (1962). 
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tion." In 1976 the New York Court of Appeals recognized the 
separation of executive and legislative powers in New York City 
government and held that certain executive action constituted 
"an impermissible exercise of legislative power vested by the New 
York City Charter in the city council."" 
Courts may turn to the state and federal separation of powers 
models to interpret a city's governing statute or charter if the city 
chooses to operate under a form of government with divided pow- 
ers. When the city of Atlanta recently abandoned the strong com- 
mission form of government, the Supreme Court of Georgia took 
occasion to comment, in dicta, that the city's charter had been 
"changed drastically" to handle the growing demands of a large 
urban area. The new charter, the court said, had established a 
government with a "classic separation of powers.""' Once this 
analogy to the state and federal systems has been made, a court 
will then be faced with the question of how far to carry the anal- 
ogy in resolving particular disputes. 
D. Martindale v. Anderson 
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of Martindale v. 
Andersonm is a dramatic departure from the traditional judicial 
view of the relationship between executive and legislative func- 
tions in municipal government. The case carries the trend of in- 
creasing executive power to its ultimate conclusion, and illus- 
trates both the theoretical and practical implications of the full- 
37. Municipal Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971). The court interpreted the 
city charter to mean that all legislative power was vested in the city commission alone, a 
limitation which applied "as well to municipalities as it does between the Congress and 
the President on the national level." Id. a t  195. Since municipal power has traditionally 
been centered in legislative bodies, this separation of powers language may serve only to 
reduce executive power. It is clear the court intended to limit executive intrusion into 
legislative functions ("History teaches us . . . the danger of vesting total power in a single 
individual . . . ." Id.), but it is not as clear the court would have limited legislative 
intrusion into executive functions. Id. 
38. Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y .2d 641,646, 350 N .E.2d 595, 598, 385 N .Y .S .2d 265, 
267 (1976). The mayor had issued an executive order that each bidder on city construction 
contracts would he required to submit an affirmative action program to ensure against 
discrimination in employment practices, and the deputy mayor had promulgated rules 
pursuant to the order requiring contractors to meet prescribed percentages of minority 
employment. The legislative policy prohibited discrimination but did not go so far as to 
mandate an affirmative action percentage program. Id. 
39. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 569, 207 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1974). Compare this 
language with that of the same court just three years earlier in Flanigen v. Preferred Dev. 
Corp., 226 Ga. 267, 174 S.E.2d 425 (1970), in which the court had stated unequivocally 
"ltlhe separation of powers doctrine does not apply to municipal governments." Id. a t  
268, 174 S.E.2d at  426. See Ford v. Mayor of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820,68 S.E. 733 (1910). 
40. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
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scale application of the separation of powers model to a municipal 
setting. 
1. Background of the case 
The Utah Constitution provides that the state legislature 
shall determine the organization of municipal governments but 
also provides that cities may adopt home rule charters." The 
governing power of all municipalities is derived entirely from the 
Utah Legislatureu and has traditionally been lodged in a single 
body exercising both executive and legislative 
In 1959 the Utah Legislature passed the first major variation 
from this traditional form of municipal government with the 
Strong Mayor Form of Government Act," which authorized a 
form of government expressly separating the powers of the board 
of commissioners from those of the mayor.45 That Act was unpo- 
pular because of technical flaws41 and was repealed in 1975 by the 
Optional Forms of Municipal qovernment Act," which itself was 
repealed, amended, and recodified in substantially the same form 
in 1977? The degree to which the 1975 Act and its 1977 amend- 
ments created a separation of municipal powers became the basis 
of the dispute in Martindale v. Anderson. 
In a 1975 referendum, the electorate of Logan, Utah, adopted 
the optional council-mayor form authorized by the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act. When the new government 
became effective, disputes arose concerning the division of execu- 
tive and legislative powers under the new form. Particularly a t  
issue were the powers asserted by the mayor to acquire and trans- 
fer property without council approval, to exercise exclusive con- 
trol over the approval of plans for proposed subdivisions, to trans- 
41. UTAH CONST. art. XI, $ 5. 
42. Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). 
43. This was either a board of commissioners, a city council, or a board of trustees, 
depending on the classification of the municipality. UTAH CODE ANN. $$ 10-6-1 to -5 (1978) 
(current version at  UTAH CODE ANN. $ 4  10-3-101 to -104 (Supp. 1977)). 
44. Ch. 20, 1959 Utah Laws 42 (repealed 1975). 
45. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 10-6-79 (1973) (repealed 1975). The option was available only 
to first and second class cities, id. 4 10-6-76 (1973) (repealed 1975), which were those with 
a population of at  least 60,000. Id. $ 10-1-1 (1973) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. 5 
10-2-301 (Supp. 1977)). 
46. R. Lee, Optional Forms of Local Government in Utah 3 (June 1976) (unpublished 
report of the Utah Department of Community Affairs). 
47. Ch. 33, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version a t  UTAH CODE ANN. $$ 10-3-1201 to 
-1228 (Supp. 1977)). This Act made the mayor-council and council-manager forms avail- 
able to all municipalities regardless of their classification. Id. 
48. UTAH CODE ANN. $5 10-3-1201 to -1228 (Supp. 1977). 
968 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
fer funds within departmental budgets, and to limit the council's 
access to administrative information. 
In March of 1977 three members of the five-member city 
council brought an action for declaratory judgment against the 
mayor.lg The trial court held that under the council-mayor form 
all executive and legislative power resided in the council, which 
was the city's governing body, with the mayor possessing only 
those powers expressly vested in him by the Act. The mayor, 
therefore, had no authority to exercise the powers he had 
claimed.") 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding the Act provided 
for a complete separation of executive and legislative powers in a 
manner patterned after the federal and state  constitution^.^' The 
mayor was therefore justified in buying, selling, or exchanging 
property and in exercising power to approve subdivision plans 
without council approval.J2 The supreme court affirmed the trial 
court's rulings on the questions of budget transfers and council 
access to administrative information, holding these powers to be 
within the legislative sphere? 
2. The court's analysis 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that under 
the new form of government the council was the locus of all resi- 
duary power-that it possessed all governing powers except those 
expressly vested in the mayor by the Act." Instead, the court 
held, the Act provided for the "complete" or "absolute'' separa- 
tion of executive and legislative powers between the mayor and 
the council with municipal governing powers residing in both.J" 
The court reasoned that the preface to the Act indicated a 
legislative intent to provide for an alternative to traditional forms 
of municipal governmentJ6 along the same lines as the 1959 Strong 
Mayor Form of Government Act?' Support for this conclusion 
49. The city attorney and city budget officer were also named as defendants. How- 
ever, the trial court later dismissed the complaint against them since, as agents of the 
mayor, they would automatically be bound by any decision concerning mayoral authority. 
Martindale v. Anderson, No. 16302 (Utah 1st Dist. Ct. Oct. 20, 1977), aff 'd  in part and 
rco'd in part, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
50. Id. 
51. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Utah 1978). 
52. Id. at  1027-28. 
53. Id. at 1029. 
54. Id. at  1023-24. 
55. Id. at 1024-27. 
56. Id. at  1025. 
57. UTAH CODE-ANN. $ 4  10-6-76 to -102 (1973) (repealed 1975). 
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was found in various portions of the Act: first, the Act provided 
that the council was to deal with the administrative affairs of the 
municipality " 'solely through the chief executive,' "" who was 
designated as the mayor; second, the council was "specifically 
defined" as the legislative body; third, the mayor was excluded 
from a seat on the council; and finally, the only legislative power 
reserved to the mayor was a veto power that could be overridden 
by a vote of two-thirds of the c o ~ n c i l . ~  The court rejected the trial 
court's emphasis on a provision declaring the council to be the 
"governing body," reasoning that a reading of the entire Act in 
light of its legislative history and that of prior legislation in the 
area revealed an intention to divide the governing power." 
Because the action was for declaratory judgment, the court 
also considered the prospective effect of the 1977 amendments to 
the Act, even though they were not in force a t  the time the action 
was filed? These modifications deleted the provision which had 
designated the council as the governing body, and declared that 
municipal government would be vested in " 'two separate, inde- 
pendent, and equal branches of municipal government.' "62 
The court then considered the specific Logan City disputes 
in light of its general reasoning. The purchase, sale, exchange, 
and management of city property were found to be executive 
functions reserved exclusively to the mayor," as was the final 
approval of city subdivisions when done in accordance with poli- 
cies and procedures adopted by the municipal council.64 These 
powers are executive rather than legislative, the court reasoned, 
because they are "policy execution powers" rather than "policy 
making powers."65 
Justice Crockett voiced a strong dissent. Since it is a basic 
rule of statutory construction that powers not expressly delegated 
are excluded, he argued, and since cities have only those powers 
58. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah 1978) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, 3 19, 1975 Utah Laws 106 
(current version at  UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1217 (Supp. 1977))). 
59. Id. a t  1025. 
60. Id. at  1027. 
61. Id. at  1026-27. 
62. Id. a t  1026 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. 5 10-3-1209 (Supp. 1977)). 
63. Id. a t  1027. 
64. The court rejected the respondents' argument that three separate statutory provi- 
sions, UTAH CODE ANN. §§  10-9-25, 17-21-8, 57-5-3 (1973) (requiring approval of subdivi- 
sions by the municipal "legislative" and "governing" body), applied. The intent of these 
provisions, the court held, was only to require approval before recordation by the appropri- 
ate authority. Since they were passed long before the new optional form was contem- 
plated, they were not controlling. 581 P.2d a t  1028. 
65. 581 P.2d a t  1027 (emphasis in original). 
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delegated to them by the state legislature, it follows that the 
mayor had only those powers expressly granted to him and not 
the additional powers he had claimedY The separation of powers 
language in the 1977 amendments must be interpreted in view of 
the historical development of the doctrine, he reasoned, which 
reveals that all undelegated power in state government rests with 
the legislative branch." Finally, Justice Crockett warned of the 
danger of abuse inherent in such a "far-reaching" grant of power 
to the mayor? 
The supreme court unanimously upheld the trial court's 
holding that a section of Utah's Uniform Municipal Fiscal Proce- 
dures Actm prohibited the mayor from transferring funds set aside 
for the purchase of specifically described line items without coun- 
cil approval. This interpretation, the court held, was consistent 
with the encumbrance system of that Act.70 The supreme court 
also affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the council was entitled 
to access to all administrative records of the city pursuant to the 
adoption of any reasonable procedure for obtaining them." 
A. A New Theoretical Framework 
The primary significance of Martindale v. Anderson is its 
sweeping redefinition of the municipal power structure.72 It recog- 
nized a form of municipal government in which executive powers 
are conferred directly and exclusively on the mayor by the state 
legislature rather than circuitously via the municipal council." 
The impact of this theoretical framework is illustrated well by the 
issue of subdivision approval in Martindale. The mayor actually 
66. Id. a t  1030-31 (Crockett, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 1030. 
68. Id. at 1031. 
69. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-10-23 to -75 (1973). 
70. 581 P.2d at 1029. 
71. Id. 
72. Counsel for the appellant described the significance of the case as follows: 
[Tlhe decision in this case . . . will have application far beyond Logan City, 
because this is the first case to reach this court and perhaps any court of final 
jurisdiction in this country defining powers and duties between the executive 
and the legislative branches in a municipality that operates under a division of 
powers system of government rather than under a council or commission having 
joint legislative and executive authority. 
Brief of Appellant at 33, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
73. Other states which presently have statutes that might be similarly interpreted 
include New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. $8 40:69A-31 to -48 (West 1967), and Ohio, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § § 705.71-.86 (Page 1976). 
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admitted the power of subdivision approval was vested in the 
council by other statutes, but argued the council had delegated 
the power to him by ~rdinance.~' The court used an entirely differ- 
ent rationale, declaring subdivision approval to be an executive 
function directly vested in the mayor and the delegation argu- 
ment to be irrelevant since the council had no executive power 
to delegate.75 
1. Finding intent to create a separation of powers 
The terms "governing body" and "governing authority" are 
commonly used in statutes of various states to refer to local legis- 
lative b~dies,~"eflecting the fact that these bodies have typically 
possessed both legislative and executive authority. If such lan- 
guage is carried over into new statutes and charters, it will create 
obstacles to judicial recognition of a municipal system in which 
executive authority is granted directly and exclusively to the 
mayor. 
In Martindale, the Utah court was confronted with such a 
situation. A provision of the Optional Forms of Municipal Gov- 
ernment Act specifically designated the city council as the 
"governing body,"77 and counsel for the respondents argued this 
language preserved the traditional allocation of local powers in 
the new form of g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  The court overcame the apparent 
effect of this language by emphasizing another provision in the 
Act that, in its view, specifically defined the city council as the 
legislative body.79 It also pointed to the 1977 amendments to the 
Act, which deleted the priginal " governing body" language and 
explicitly described " 'two separate, independent, and equal 
branches of municipal government.' "80 Although the court stated 
these amendments were being considered for their prospective 
effect only, it relied heavily on them as evidence that the original 
intent of the state legislature had been to vest the complete exec- 
74. Brief of Appellant a t  26-27, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
75. 581 P.2d at 1028. 
76. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE Ej 5402 (West 1966); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-13-6-3 (Burns 
Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 23(9) (Vernon 1969). 
77. Ch. 33, Ej 11, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version a t  UTAH CODE ANN. Ji 10-3-1210 
(Supp. 1977)). 
78. Brief of Respondents a t  11-12, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 
1978). 
79. 581 P.2d at 1025, 1027 (construing Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, 
ch. 33, Ej 2(2), 1975 Utah Laws 106 (repealed 1977)). 
80. Id. at 1026 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. 8 10-3-1209 (Supp. 1977)). 
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utive power in the mayor.R1 Without similar manifestations of 
intent, courts in other states would have more difficulty overcom- 
ing traditional language to reach the same conclusion. 
2. Selecting the appropriate separation of powers model 
Federal and state separation of powers models may prove 
helpful in analyzing a municipal separation of powers system. 
However, in seeking guidance from these models courts should 
not overlook differences in the theoretical underpinnings of the 
state and federal governmentsg2 and simply assume, as the Utah 
court apparently did," that either model is equally appropriate. 
There is a basic theoretical flaw in an analogy between the 
separation of powers in municipal government and the separation 
of powers in state government. As the Martindale dissent pointed 
out, a state legislature derives its power directly from the people 
and "the residuum of any undelegated power is reposed 
therein."8-l In most municipal governments, by contrast, no simi- 
lar residuum of power rests with the local legi~lature.~Vn the 
81. See 581 P.2d at 1026-27. Further evidence that the state legislature had originally 
intended to give a blanket grant of executive power to the mayor in the 1975 Act may be 
found by making a comparison of the statutory language governing the separated powers 
form with the council-manager option available under the Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act. Under the council-manager form, the provision dealing with the powers 
of the mayor expressly states that he shall have only those powers conferred upon him by 
the Act. Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, Q 25, 1975 Utah Laws 106 
(current version at UTAH CODE ANN. 4 10-3-1223 (Supp. 1977)). By contrast, the provision 
establishing the mayor's duties under the mayor-council form contains no such express 
limitation. 
There is language in the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act that might 
support a contrary conclusion, however. One provision of the Act grants the municipal 
council in the council-mayor form the power to prescribe additional duties for the mayor. 
Ch. 33, Q 21(9), 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. Q 10-3-1219(9) 
(Supp. 1977)). It might be argued this provision indicates the state legislature intended 
to leave a pool of executive power under the control of the council. 
82. Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 3€!3,374 P.2d 516,518 (1962) (footnotes omitted): 
[The State Legislature] is significantly different . . . from the federal govern- 
ment, which is a government of limited powers . . . expressly granted to it by 
the states through the Federal Constitution; whereas, the State Legislature, 
having the residuum of governmental power, does not look to the State Constitu- 
tion for the grant of its powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the limita- 
tions on its authority. 
83. 581 P.2d at 1024. 
84. Id. at 1030 (Crockett, J., dissenting) (citing Trade Comm. v. Skaggs Drug Cen- 
ters, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968), and Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 
P.2d 516 (1962)). See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 276 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1971); In re 
Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 604, 9 6  P.2d 347, 351 (1968). 
85. E.g., Cobo v. O'Bryant, 116 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1959). Some jurisdictions, on the 
other hand, have recognized a limited right of local self-government. E.g., State v. Fox, 
158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902). 
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municipal system described in Martindale, for example, neither 
the council nor the mayor has any residual powers,nfi though each 
does possess a broad statutory authorization to perform, respec- 
tively, any legislative or executive functions the state legislature 
properly delegates to municipalities. In this respect, a better 
analogy for theoretical purposes might be found in the structure 
of the federal government since it is also a government of dele- 
gated powers." 
B. Allocation of Specific Municipal Functions 
A statute or charter creating a municipal separation of pow- 
ers system probably would not exhaustively classify executive 
and legislative functions, explicitly assigning each function to the 
appropriate branch of city government. The court in Martindale 
apparently assumed that a simple executive-legislative dichot- 
omy provided sufficient guidance where there is no specific statu- 
tory allocation of functions." However, conflicting language in 
preexisting statutes and the generality of the executive-legislative 
distinction would pose problems both for courts and municipal 
officers attempting to apply that formula. 
I .  Inconsistent language in general municipal statutes 
Apart from those statutes creating specific forms of munici- 
pal government, most states have general municipal statutes 
which govern the operation of municipalities not operating under 
their own charters. These statutes often contain language indicat- 
ing that the power to perform particular municipal functions is 
vested in the local legislative body? Since these statutes do not 
contemplate the existence of forms of government with complete 
separation of executive and legislative powers, this language may 
not necessarily reflect an intent on the part of the state legislature 
to classify particular functions as legislative rather than execu- 
tive. 
86. Utah adheres to the prevailing view that a municipality is only a creature of the 
state and cannot, by its very nature, possess any residual governmental powers. Salt Lake 
City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (1971); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 
533, 216 P. 234 (1923). 
87. This analogy would not be as appropriate, however, wheie an inherent right of 
local self-government is recognized, see note 85 supra, or where a home rule charter creates 
a greater degree of local autonomy. E.g. Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 
523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975). In these situations an analogy to state government might be 
more appropriate. 
88. 581 P.2d at 1027-28. 
89. E.g, C h .  GOV'T CODE 4 34091.1 (West 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, $ 4  1- 
102(3), 22-112 (West 1978). 
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In Utah, for example, various statutory provisions which con- 
fer the power to perform particular functions on municipalities 
refer to the "board of commissioners, city council or . . . board 
of  trustee^,"^ the "governing body,"91 the "legislative body,"92 or 
simply to "they."93 In light of Martindale, these designations con- 
fuse role definition since their literal application to the new 
mayor-council form is inappropriate. Each particular provision 
must now be scrutinized to determine whether the particular 
function is inherently executive or legi~lative.~' 
2. Generality of the executive-legislative distinction 
The distinction between executive and legislative matters is 
too general to provide workable standards for categorizing spe- 
cific municipal functions. The confusion which could result from 
the use of this formula alone is illustrated by the fact that the 
decision to rezone a specific piece of land is considered to be a 
legislative function in California," a judicial function in Oregon,' 
and an administrative function in Utah.97 
In Martindale the court failed to deal with this danger and 
simply assumed the policymaking versus policy-execution dis- 
tinction was sufficiently definitive. It then characterized the 
transfer of property and the approval of subdivisions as "clearly" 
executive  function^,^^ apparently ignoring the fact that the deci- 
sion to purchase a particular tract of land or deny approval of a 
large development might have major policymaking implications 
90. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 10-7-6 (1973) (power to make contracts for public lighting). 
91. Id. 8 10-8-17 (power to control water distribution). 
92. Id. 8 10-9-4 (power to appoint a planning commission). 
93. Id. 8 10-8-14 (power to control utilities and public transportation). 
94. The appellant suggested the following approach: "In short, where the general 
municipal laws are consistent with the council-mayor form, they are to be literally ap- 
plied. Where they are not consistent they are superseded and modified to the extent of 
the incompatibility.'' Brief of Appellant at 14, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 
(Utah 1978). Utah courts and municipal officers may also experience some difficulty in 
interpreting future general municipal statutes in light of the Martindale holding. Any 
attempt by the state legislature to confer an executive function by general statute on all 
municipal legislative bodies, including the council in the council-mayor form, would re- 
quire an explicit amendment to the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. Other- 
wise, the new legislation could lose its intended effect by being confused with statutes 
passed prior to the Act which have no bearing on the distribution of powers in the council- 
mayor form. 
95. Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467,137 Cal. Rptr. 
304 (1977). 
96. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). 
97. Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964). 
98. 581 P.2d at  1027-28. 
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at a local level.gB 
The Martindale approach, therefore, gives little guidance for 
the resolution of future disputes. In the absence of language in a 
statute or charter spelling out respective powers in careful detail, 
the prospect of recurring adjudication threatens to disrupt the 
operation of municipalities seeking to solidify the roles of the 
mayor and council under governments with separated powers. 
3. Possible sources of clarification 
One possible solution to the problems of classification might 
be to turn to federal or state models. While these models have 
value in defining the general contours of power, they may not be 
very useful in resolving particular disputes. Although municipal 
and federal governments are similar in that both are governments 
of delegated powers,Im many specific municipal functions have no 
clear federal equivalent. On the other hand, while many of the 
functions performed by municipal governments have a more ob- 
vious state equivalent, state and municipal separation of powers 
structures are theoretically dissimilar. Io1 
In Martindale the court apparently did not find the state and 
federal models dispositive. Although it described the new form of 
government as one "framed in the image of the federal and state 
systems,"102 it classified the disposition of public property as an 
executive prerogative in spite of the fact that it is under the 
ultimate control of the legislative branch at  the state and federal 
levels. lo" 
A better source for clarifying executive and legislative roles 
might be found in the case law dealing with the referendum pro- 
cess. Because of the well-established general rule that only legis- 
lative action is subject to referendum, the courts have long dealt 
with the executive-legislative distinction a t  the municipal level 
in that context.lo4 This approach is consistent with the holding in 
Martindale since the Utah court, as well as the courts of other 
99. The court also overlooked the fact that the Act itself gives the council the power 
to "hold executive sessions . . . for the purpose of discussion of . . . land acquisition." 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, 8 13, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current 
versiqn at UTAH CODE ANN. 5 10-3-1212 (Supp. 1977)). 
100. See text accompanying notes 82-87 supra. 
101. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text, supra. 
102. 581 P.2d at 1024. 
103. U.S. CONST. art. IVY 8 3; UTAH CONST. art. XIX, 8 2; UTAH CONST. art. XX, $1 .  
104. E.g., Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Keigley v. Bench, 97 
Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939). See Note, The LegislativelAdministrative Dichotomy and 
the Use of Initiative and Referendum in a North Dakota Home Rule City, 51 N.D.L. REV. 
855 (1975). 
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states, have held that actions concerning specific pieces of prop- 
erty are administrative in nature and not subject to the referen- 
dum process.Io5 
One other possible source of clarification is the law arising 
out of the commonly used discretionary function exception to the 
waiver of governmental immunity.Io6 The distinction between 
planning (discretionary) and operational (nondiscretionary) 
functions in the governmental immunity context resembles the 
distinction between the policymaking and policy-execution func- 
tions described in Martindale. Io7 However, almost no governmen- 
tal act is totally nondiscretionary,lo8 and the discretionary func- 
tion exception applies to many functions performed by the execu- 
tive branch of government.10g Therefore, a direct application of 
precedent from the governmental immunity setting to the separa- 
tion of powers setting would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, case 
law in that area considers similar issues in specific factual set- 
tings and may shed light on the problem of c lass i f i~at ion.~~~ 
C. Checks on the Abuse of Executive Power 
The exact parameters of the mayor's authority in a munici- 
pal government with separated powers are as yet undefined. In- 
deed, the Utah court's use of the terms "absolute" and 
 complete"^^ seems to have given the dissenting justice in 
Martindale good reason to warn of the dangers of "wilful1 [sic] 
arrogation of powers."112 The court, however, overstated its point 
105. E.g., State v. Salome, 167 Kan. 766, 208 P.2d 198 (1949); Monahan v. Funk, 137 
Or. 580, 3 P.2d 778 (1931); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964). 
106. In spite of the large-scale abrogation of governmental immunity, immunity is 
often preserved if a basic policy decision (discretionary function) is involved. E.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE 4 820.2 (West 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. F) 63-30- 
lO(1) (1978). 
107. See generally Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Excep- 
tion: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L. REV. 930, 
950-52 (1971). The discretionary function exception was not created for the purpose of 
maintaining a separation of executive and legislative functions. It  does, however, reflect 
the basic logic of the separation of powers in the sense that it represents a reluctance on 
the part of the judicial branch to intervene in areas committed to other branches of 
government. Id. a t  946, 959. 
108. Id. at 952. 
109. E.g., Dahelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 37-42 (1953); Cobb v. Waddington, 
154 N.J. Super. 11, 380 A.2d 1145 (1977). 
110. Seegenerally Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Excep- 
tion: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L. REV. 930, 
954-69 (1970). Utah cases defining discretionary functions include Andrus v. State, 541 
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), and Carroll v. State Rd. Comm., 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 
(1972). 
111. 581 P.2d a t  1024. 
112. Id. a t  1031 (Crockett, J., dissenting). 
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in using such terms since the separation of powers doctrine has 
never been interpreted to require that the branches of govern- 
ment be hermetically sealed off from each other.l13 A structural 
analysis of this new form of municipal government reveals several 
checks on executive power. 
One major source of control may be found in the ultimate 
budgetary authority traditionally considered to repose in the leg- 
islative branch. In Martindale, for example, the court construed 
Utah's Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act114 in such a 
manner as to allow the city council tight budgetary control of the 
mayor's expenditures. Under this ruling, the council has power to 
prevent virtually all unapproved expenditures through the use of 
specifically described line items.l15 In spite of the court's holding 
that the acquisition of land is an executive function, the council's 
careful use of this budgetary power in the future could strictly 
limit a mayor's ability to purchase land without its authorization. 
This method of control will not provide any limitation on a 
mayor's power to sell or exchange property, however.l16 
A second source of control rests in the general power of a 
legislative body to formulate rules and procedures for executive 
action. By exercising its power to frame these rules with precision, 
a city council can exercise a substantial degree of control over a 
mayor. In Martindale, the court implicitly recognized the pro- 
priety of this technique when it discussed the action the city 
council had taken in setting forth specific rules governing the 
procedures for review and approval of planned unit, interblock, 
and cluster developments.l17 Consequently, in spite of the court's 
holding that the ultimate power of subdivision approval is vested 
in the mayor, carefully drafted procedural rules such as these 
minimize any danger of mayoral abuse. 
The Martindale court suggested a third possible limitation 
on executive power when it held the city council was entitled to 
-- 
113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 
8, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1942) (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). 
114. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 § 10-10-23 to -75 (1973). 
115. 581 P.2d a t  1029. 
116. A Utah mayor is still subject to the rule prohibiting a city from disposing of 
public property by gift without authority from the state legislature. Sears v. Ogden City, 
533 P.2d 118 (Utah 1975). 
117. 581 P.2d a t  1028. The propriety of this technique is further illustrated by the 
fact that imprecise municipal regulations are sometimes held invalid on the theory that 
they result in the improper delegation of executive power. E.g., City of South Euclid v. 
Glazer, 43 Ohio Misc. 9, 332 N.E.2d 780 (1974) (ordinance invalid for failure to provide 
sufficient guidance to mayor). Accord, Sonn v. Planning Comm., 172 Conn. 156,374 A.2d 
159 (1976). 
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reasonable access to all administrative records.11u The language of 
the opinion gives no indication that this access might be re- 
stricted by the doctrine of executive pri~ilege."~ The possibility 
that all executive records might be available for legislative scru- 
tiny may serve as another safeguard against executive abuse. 
A fourth possible limitation on the mayor's exercise of power 
will arise in a system characterized as having "complete" or 
"absolute" separation of powerslm if courts turn to precedent from 
the governmental immunity area for guidance in classifying par- 
ticular functions as executive or legislative.121 In doing so, courts 
might be influenced by case law in that area which emphasizes 
the planning nature of many acts commonly performed by execu- 
tive officers.In As a result, courts may be more likely to see the 
policymaking implications of those functions and determine that 
those functions belong to the local legislative body rather than 
the mayor. 
Finally, other checks on executive power might be written 
directly into the statute or charter creating this new form of gov- 
ernment. For example, provisions might be drafted which would 
allow for legislative veto and review of certain executive actions. 
This approach is used in Utah's Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act, which provides that the mayor's authority to 
prescribe the duties of some municipal officers is subject to the 
council's power to do the same by ordinance.Iz3 In addition, provi- 
sions carefully enumerating the powers granted to each branch of 
government might be included as a further protection against 
abuse. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In response to the need for greater efficiency in municipal 
administration, new forms of local government have emerged that 
allow increased executive authority and autonomy. As a result, 
the process of municipal administration has become less entan- 
gled with the process of municipal legislation, and the doctrine 
118. 581 P.2d at 1029. 
119. In this respect this form of municipal government appears to deviate from the 
federal model. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Lee, Executive Privilege. 
Congressional Subpoena Power, a d  Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and 
Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 231, 231 n.2. 
120. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d at 1024. 
121. See text accompanying notes 107-10, supra. 
122. E.g., Dahelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 37-42 (1953); Cobb v. Waddington, 
154 N.J. Super. 11, 380 A.2d 1145 (1977). 
123. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 10-3-1219(7) (Supp. 1977). 
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of separation of powers has become more relevant a t  a local level. 
The culmination of this trend is a form of government such as the 
one recognized in Martindale v. Anderson, a government ex- 
pressly patterned after a classic separation of powers model. 
Since such a system represents a dramatic departure from 
the traditional structure of local government, its adoption may 
create difficulties in the allocation of municipal functions and the 
prevention of mayoral abuse. Although Martindale leaves many 
questions unanswered, it does suggest that solutions to these 
problems are available and that the doctrine of separation of 
powers may provide a workable alternative framework for struc- 
turing municipal government. 
Bradley E. Morris 
